Lessons Learned During TBCC Design for the NASA-AFRL Joint System Study by Espinosa, A. M. & Snyder, Christopher A.
Christopher A. Snyder
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
A.M. (Jose) Espinosa
The Boeing Company, St. Louis, Missouri
Lessons Learned During TBCC Design for the
NASA-AFRL Joint System Study
NASA/TM—2013-218100
December 2013
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140005752 2019-08-29T14:05:49+00:00Z
NASA STI Program . . . in Profi le
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA Scientifi c and Technical Information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role.
The NASA STI Program operates under the auspices 
of the Agency Chief Information Offi cer. It collects, 
organizes, provides for archiving, and disseminates 
NASA’s STI. The NASA STI program provides access 
to the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database and 
its public interface, the NASA Technical Reports 
Server, thus providing one of the largest collections 
of aeronautical and space science STI in the world. 
Results are published in both non-NASA channels 
and by NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which 
includes the following report types:
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major signifi cant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
programs and include extensive data or theoretical 
analysis. Includes compilations of signifi cant 
scientifi c and technical data and information 
deemed to be of continuing reference value. 
NASA counterpart of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent of 
graphic presentations.
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientifi c 
and technical fi ndings that are preliminary or 
of specialized interest, e.g., quick release 
reports, working papers, and bibliographies that 
contain minimal annotation. Does not contain 
extensive analysis.
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientifi c and 
technical fi ndings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees.
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientifi c and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or cosponsored by NASA.
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientifi c, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having substantial 
public interest.
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientifi c and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.
Specialized services also include creating custom 
thesauri, building customized databases, organizing 
and publishing research results.
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI program home page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov
• E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov
• Fax your question to the NASA STI 
Information Desk at 443–757–5803
• Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at
 443–757–5802
• Write to:
           STI Information Desk
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
           7115 Standard Drive
           Hanover, MD 21076–1320
Christopher A. Snyder
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
A.M. (Jose) Espinosa
The Boeing Company, St. Louis, Missouri
Lessons Learned During TBCC Design for the
NASA-AFRL Joint System Study
NASA/TM—2013-218100
December 2013
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Glenn Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Prepared for the
58th Joint Army-Navy-NASA-Air Force (JANNAF) Propulsion Meeting
sponsored by the JANNAF Interagency Propulsion Committee
Arlington, Virginia, April 18–22, 2011
Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank the Fundamental Aeronautics Program, Hypersonic management team for supporting this work
and our efforts. The authors also wish to acknowledge the rest of the Boeing team: Marty Bradley, Dan Farrell, Matt Sexton, 
Josh Stengel, Deric Babcock for their contributions to this effort. The contracted part of this work was performed under NASA 
Contract no.: NNL08AA16B, Task Order no.: NNL08AB43T. The authors also extend our appreciation to David Witte (NASA 
Langley Research Center, the Technical Monitor for this contract) for his technical guidance and support, which allowed us to 
pursue some of the additional efforts that taught us so much.
Available from
NASA Center for Aerospace Information
7115 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076–1320
National Technical Information Service
5301 Shawnee Road
Alexandria, VA 22312
Available electronically at http://www.sti.nasa.gov
This work was sponsored by the Fundamental Aeronautics Program 
at the NASA Glenn Research Center.
Level of Review: This material has been technically reviewed by technical management. 
NASA/TM—2013-218100 1 
Lessons Learned During TBCC Design for the 
NASA-AFRL Joint System Study 
 
Christopher A. Snyder 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Glenn Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
 
A.M. (Jose) Espinosa 
The Boeing Company 
St. Louis, Missouri 63166 
Abstract 
NASA and the Air Force Research Laboratory are involved in a Joint System Study (JSS) on 
Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) vehicles. The JSS will examine the performance, operability and analysis 
uncertainty of unmanned, fully reusable, TSTO launch vehicle concepts. NASA is providing a vehicle 
concept using turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) propulsion on the booster stage and an all-rocket 
orbiter. The variation in vehicle and mission requirements for different potential customers, combined 
with analysis uncertainties, make it problematic to define optimum vehicle types or concepts, but the 
study is being used by NASA for tool assessment and development, and to identify technology gaps. 
Preliminary analyses were performed on the entire TBCC booster concept; then higher-fidelity analyses 
were performed for particular areas to verify results or reduce analysis uncertainties. Preliminary TBCC 
system analyses indicated that there would be sufficient thrust margin over its mission portion. The higher 
fidelity analyses, which included inlet and nozzle performance corrections for significant area mismatches 
between TBCC propulsion requirements versus the vehicle design, resulted in significant performance 
penalties from the preliminary results. TBCC system design and vehicle operation assumptions were 
reviewed to identify items to mitigate these performance penalties. The most promising items were then 
applied and analyses rerun to update performance predictions. A study overview is given to orient the 
reader, quickly focusing upon the NASA TBCC booster and low speed propulsion system. Details for the 
TBCC concept and the analyses performed are described. Finally, a summary of “Lessons Learned” are 
discussed with suggestions to improve future study efforts.  
Introduction 
The Multi-Disciplinary, Analysis and Optimization (MDAO) discipline supporting the Hypersonics 
Project of the NASA Fundamental Aeronautics Program is tasked with identifying concepts and 
technologies that will enable safer, cheaper and more flexible access to space and high speed flight in the 
atmosphere. As part of that activity, MDAO must develop tools and techniques that analyze and assess 
these various concepts and technologies. Another integral function is defining different potential missions 
and vehicles that cover the solution space to best achieve the project goals. While exercising the various 
tools and techniques for vehicle and technology assessments, shortcomings in design methodologies and 
tools are exposed. Simultaneously, other potential mission, vehicle, and technology concepts are 
discovered. This process in not performed in a vacuum; working relationships are formed with industry, 
universities and other government agencies to share and advance our capabilities.  
The Joint System Study (JSS) is a joint NASA/Air Force system study focused on Two-Stage-to-
Orbit (TSTO) concepts. The Air Force supplied two vehicle concepts, both utilizing an all-rocket booster, 
one with a rocket orbiter, the other with a rocket-based combined-cycle (RBCC) orbiter. The NASA 
TSTO concept utilized a turbine-based combined-cycle (TBCC) booster and rocket orbiter. NASA and 
the Air Force agreed on common ground rules and assumptions, including developing a concept of 
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operations which would be used to assess development, refurbishment and life-cycle costs. Each group 
would perform an initial assessment of the other’s concepts to highlight tool capabilities and limitations, 
and identify areas for joint efforts (tools, concept development, etc.). With the amount of uncertainty in 
technology assumptions and analysis capability, and with some understanding how that uncertainty can 
bias study results, NASA will not use this study to choose vehicle types or concepts. The overall focus for 
this exercise was tool assessment and development (including developing vehicle types and concepts) and 
identifying generic technology gaps.  
This paper reports the work performed on the TBCC propulsion design, focusing on the low speed 
portion (up to Mach 3, where the air breathing propulsion transitions from gas turbine to ramjet/scramjet 
mode). Some background on the mission and NASA vehicle is given, quickly focusing on the low speed 
propulsion system. Initial assumptions used to develop baseline, uninstalled gas turbine engine 
performance and example engine performance are presented. Then the inlet and nozzle design concepts 
are introduced, leading to the higher fidelity analysis results. These analyses indicated a significant 
installation penalty from overexpansion losses on the low speed propulsion exhaust flow as well as the 
base drag from the single-expansion ramp nozzle (SERN) optimized for high speed performance. Under 
the given vehicle and propulsion constraints, various aspects of the low speed system design and high 
speed propulsion operation were reviewed to identify the most promising items to review further and 
possibly revise to mitigate installation penalties. That process led to some design and operational 
assumption changes; the higher fidelity tools were exercised again and these updated results are 
discussed. Finally, the “Lessons Learned” and “Summary” are presented to guide future efforts for better 
vehicle designs and operational concepts.  
Results and Discussion 
NASA TSTO Mission and Vehicle Concept 
The NASA TSTO vehicle concept booster uses highly integrated air-breathing propulsion (with 
booster rocket assist as necessary) and an all-rocket orbiter. The baseline mission profile is shown in 
Figure 1. The launch vehicle concept is assumed to be unmanned, fully reusable and sized to deploy (or 
retrieve) a 20,000 lb payload to a 100100 nmi., 28.5° inclination orbit. 
 
 
Figure 1.—NASA baseline TSTO mission profile. 
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Gas turbine engines are used for the mated ascent of the booster and orbiter, with booster rockets 
augmenting air breathing thrust for the takeoff and transonic push-through. At Mach 3, the air breathing 
propulsion system undergoes mode transition from gas turbine to ramjet/scramjet, which subsequently 
accelerates the vehicle to Mach 8. The booster rocket engines are then reignited for a pull-up maneuver to 
the staging point (to release the orbiter at its most advantageous state). The all-rocket orbiter proceeds to 
orbit. The booster makes a complex maneuver to recover from staging and returns to the launch site. The 
cruise-back is initially scramjet-powered with the final portion similar to the shuttle with a glide back to 
terminal area energy management and dead stick landing.  
Figure 2 shows an image of the vehicle concept just after separation, noting that the upper surface of 
the booster vehicle is contoured for the orbiter shape to reduce drag effects while mated. Figure 3 is a top 
view of the booster, with some preliminary concepts for packaging of internal items. As shown in this 
figure, the booster volume is dominated by propellant. The low speed propulsion system is integrated 
above the high speed propulsion modules, which are located on the bottom of the booster vehicle.  
 
 
Figure 2.—NASA TSTO vehicle concept. 
 
 
Figure 3.—Top view of booster. 
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Figure 4.—Bottom view of booster. 
 
Figure 5.—Low speed propulsion conceptual design. 
 
Figure 4 shows the booster from the bottom, indicating the ramjet/scramjet sidewalls of the high 
speed propulsion modules. These sidewalls extend into and partition the low speed propulsion area. 
Therefore the integration of the turbine engines includes constraining engine size to fit between the high 
speed module sidewalls and is covered later in this report. The overall air-breathing propulsion can be 
considered a variant of an over-under TBCC concept. 
Low Speed Propulsion Concept 
The major components of the low speed propulsion concept can be seen in Figure 5. The booster 
design was optimized for high speed propulsion performance where a significant portion of the first stage 
launch energy is supplied. The low speed system was then constrained on its booster location and size. 
The inlet concept incorporates mixed compression, variable geometry, and boundary layer bleed to 
provide efficient turbine airflow capture while maintaining operability margin. The inlet is highly 
integrated with the high-speed inlet and forebody. The nozzle concept also assumes variable geometry 
and is also highly integrated with the high-speed SERN. 
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Figure 6.—Schematic of RTA-1 engine. 
 
 
Figure 7.—Turbine engine packaging and sizing. 
 
An advanced technology turbine engine was assumed, with the initial baseline engine being the 
Revolutionary Turbine Accelerator (RTA) (Ref. 1). A schematic of the RTA engine concept is shown in 
Figure 6. This is a high-thrust, high Mach-capable engine (versions of the RTA concept have good 
operating capabilities to Mach 4+). TBCC integration and sizing goals are (1) maximize TBCC thrust 
during the ascent/acceleration phase, (2) minimize booster rocket usage (while maintaining sufficient 
thrust and accelerations levels), and (3) meet vehicle packaging constraints (fit between the engine side 
walls for the high-speed ramjet/scramjet flow paths). 
Initial Engine Packaging and Sizing 
The gas turbine engine installation and sizing constraints were (1) the gas turbine engine had to fit 
between the high speed engine sidewalls, (2) turbine engine maximum diameter was limited to 80 in. (an 
assumed manufacturing size limitation), and (3) only a single row of turbine engines (could not have two 
rows of engines, to limit low speed flow path complexity and interactions). Various trades on engine size 
and packaging are shown in Figure 7. The initial booster propulsion design included four high speed 
propulsion modules per vehicle, which resulted in a total of four, 77 in. maximum diameter engines. 
Maximum available diameter of 80 in. results in a 77 in. engine to allow some minimal room for 
mounting and access. Trying to add two, smaller diameter engines, side by side in the duct, resulted in 
14 percent less airflow. Conferring with the high speed propulsion designer, going from four to three high 
speed modules (across the bottom of the booster) was an acceptable design. This enabled the low speed 
system to include six, 77 in. maximum diameter gas turbines, a 50 percent increase in airflow and 
possibly thrust from the initial vehicle layout and was the baseline system. If turbine engine size 
limitations were relaxed, four, 100 in. diameter engines could be installed within the original booster 
concept that assumed four high speed propulsion modules. For the present study baseline booster with 
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three high speed propulsion modules, three 154 in. maximum diameter engines could be installed. The 
former increases airflow about 12 percent from the revised baseline. This is only a small gain, but 
potentially requires only a small improvement in turbomachinery technology. The latter option realizes a 
100 percent increase in airflow from the revised baseline, but requires a much larger improvement in 
turbomachinery technology. These options were not pursued further during this study.  
Initial Gas Turbine Engine Performance 
Uninstalled turbine engine performance estimation is a combination of various factors, including inlet 
size and performance, engine cycle and size, and nozzle performance. It was assumed that the inlet design 
would be sized and operated to match engine airflow requirements. An additional inlet parameter for 
turbine engine performance is total pressure recovery (defined as the ratio of engine face total pressure to 
free stream total pressure). A modification to the inlet correlation from Billig (Ref. 2) was used, and is 
shown in Figure 8, with Mil Spec E-5007D as a reference. The recovery from the original correlation 
below Mach 1 was set to 0.95, based on experience with other inlet design efforts and previous study 
results for similar integrations.  
Nozzle performance is highly dependent on its integration with the vehicle. For an initial estimate, 
nozzle velocity coefficient (ratio of actual to ideal nozzle exit velocity assuming expansion to ambient 
pressure) was derived from the work performed for a Mach 10 cruiser vehicle (Ref. 3) and is shown in 
Figure 9. The present booster concept is similar in shape to the Mach 10 cruiser. 
 
 
Figure 8.—Inlet recovery. 
 
 
Figure 9.—Nozzle velocity coefficient. 
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The original plan was to generate engine performance for the RTA cycle using the model developed 
during the RTA project, but questions of proprietary data rights resulted in a generic, afterburning gas 
turbine model being generated from open data. The data from this model is representative of a RTA-class 
engine sized for this vehicle and can be shared by all. The generic model also enables modifications in 
some inlet, nozzle and engine parameters to be captured in the engine performance; but this model lacks 
capability to capture effects from additional parameters without further enhancement. Many external and 
internal engine parameters are available from this model. To illustrate the types of overall output at the 
baseline inlet and nozzle performance shown above, engine net thrust, net specific impulse and nozzle 
exit area per mass flow are shown in Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12, respectively. These are plotted 
along lines of constant dynamic pressure (q, with units of pounds-force per foot (Ref. 2)). There are some 
expectations of reporting this model for more general use, but that is outside present project plans. 
 
 
Figure 10.—Engine net thrust per airflow. 
 
 
Figure 11.—Engine net specific impulse. 
 
 
Figure 12.—Nozzle exit area per mass flow. 
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Current (2011) plans include developing an open, generic model for the RTA cycle that would be 
available for general distribution and integrated into the hypersonic analysis framework. The generic 
model will have the additional fidelity to enable engine component technology assessments and the 
inclusion of additional engine concepts. 
Based on the initial booster vehicle size and geometry, low speed propulsion performance was 
generated and used for preliminary vehicle sizing and mission analyses. For this initial part of the study, 
in addition to thrust and drag forces from the low speed propulsion, it was assumed that adverse pressure 
fields on the booster lower surface would be minimal or could be easily mitigated (similar to results from 
the previous Mach 10 cruiser efforts). The booster rockets (essentially used to provide thrust for a pull-up 
maneuver and orient the orbiter for optimal separation conditions from the booster) were also used to 
provide some additional thrust from takeoff through transonic to maintain adequate thrust margin, as 
opposed to redesigning the low speed propulsion system. Based on initial performance assumptions, a 
“closed” vehicle design was achieved. Boeing Phantom Works was contracted to perform inlet and nozzle 
design, and provide higher fidelity analyses at particular flight points that would be used to calibrate 
lower fidelity analyses.  
Inlet Design 
The overall low speed inlet system is located internally above the high speed propulsion modules and 
their sub-systems. The low speed inlet door is highly integrated within the high speed forebody, to not 
adversely impact flow to the high speed propulsion modules when the low speed mode is not operating. 
The design and location of the low speed inlet includes many considerations and constraints. The higher 
and farther forward the inlet door is on the forebody, the greater the length, volume and weight required 
by the low speed propulsion system. But this also reduces the amount of flow turning and boundary layer 
growth for the flow captured by the low speed inlet, which reduces the amount of inlet bleed (and drag) 
and the amount of flow turning for turbine engine airflow (improving inlet performance, starting 
capability and operability). Conversely, positioning the low speed inlet door lower and farther aft on the 
forebody increases its interaction with the high speed inlet ramp, potentially disrupting the high speed 
propulsion airflow, especially during the critical propulsion mode transition from gas turbine to 
ramjet/scramjet. In addition, after the low speed inlet is closed, there are still heat loads and sealing 
requirements on the low speed inlet door. These requirements become more stringent as the low speed 
inlet door location is moved further aft on the booster forebody.  
Boeing explored a few different inlet door concepts, including a traditional rotating flap design and a 
drawer concept (also called a translating scoop), as shown in Figure 13. The rotating flap concept was 
deemed impractical considering the required flap length to get a reasonable flow turning angle and 
minimizing the disruption of flow aft of the low speed inlet along the vehicle forebody and into the high 
speed system. The drawer concept was chosen for further design and analysis.  
To provide the required capture, the drawer translates forward and down, as shown in Figure 14. This 
design maintains reasonable inlet turning angles and flow quality to the low speed inlet, while minimizing 
flow disruption aft of the low speed inlet. When closed, the drawer concept maintains the desired 
forebody shape and angles optimized for the high speed propulsion system. 
Nozzle Design 
The low speed nozzle design is highly integrated within the ramjet/scramjet SERN and is shown in 
Figure 15. Each turbine engine has its own individual nozzle, which starts with a circular to rectangular 
transition section. The upper nozzle surface is fixed and contoured such that the rotating lower body flap 
gives some variation for the nozzle throat; although throat area only varies by 30 percent over its expected 
Mach 0 to 3.5 speed range. The design is short and limits the amount of surface area subjected to the hot 
turbine exhaust flow, but there is still sufficient length to achieve good flow, variable geometry and 
performance qualities. 
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Figure 13.—Low speed inlet design concepts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.—Inlet drawer translation. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 15.—Low speed nozzle schematic. 
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Figure 16.—Total engine nozzle area versus vehicle aft body. 
Initial Higher Fidelity Analyses 
As opposed to earlier study results for the Mach 10 cruiser, initial transonic CFD analyses for the 
booster showed significant overexpansion of the low speed propulsion exhaust flow. There was minimal 
flow separation or ambient flow expanding into the SERN that would alleviate large regions significantly 
below ambient pressure. These large, sub-ambient pressure regions result in significant drag forces and 
adverse vehicle moments during the low speed portion of the vehicle ascent. Much larger amounts of 
rocket assist were required during mission and sizing analyses to meet acceleration requirements than 
were initially assumed. This can be partially explained by the mismatch of low speed nozzle area required 
versus the SERN or vehicle aft body area, as shown in Figure 16. These effects can also be attributed to 
constraints put on the low speed propulsion design that were not realized during the preliminary, lower 
fidelity analyses. Since there was not time or resources for a major vehicle redesign, the design and 
operational assumptions were reviewed to identify potential solutions for this issue.  
Engine Airflow Sizing 
Review of the engine design found that it was based on using available engine components to build a 
test article for the RTA program. The engine face diameter (which determines airflow) was 57 in., but 
engine maximum diameter (which sets the limit for engine size) was 70 in. This is an engine face to 
maximum diameter ratio of 0.81. Previous study and actual engine designs suggests that internal 
rearrangement could reasonably enable an engine face to maximum diameter ratio up to 0.95. Such 
rearrangement would result in some small increase in engine length, but engine length was not limiting in 
this concept. Applying the 0.95 ratio of engine face to maximum diameter increases turbine engine 
airflow (and preliminary thrust capability) by 37 percent. Further increases in engine airflow capability 
were reviewed, but appeared to be at the limit of technology available within the study ground rules and 
assumptions. Vehicle operation was reviewed to determine if other options might be included to improve 
performance before the higher fidelity analyses were rerun with the increased airflow capability.  
Operational Trades 
Another potential option to improve performance is to configure the high speed flow path such that it 
mitigates some of the adverse pressure fields around the vehicle by filling some of the large SERN area, 
especially during transonic ascent. Previous studies (including Ref. 3) realized best vehicle performance 
by closing the high speed system until close to its operational regime; this was the baseline assumption 
for this study. This booster vehicle has a much smaller ratio of low to high speed propulsion system size 
and greater booster height than that study. The low speed exhaust is over-expanded for much of the low 
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TABLE 1.—DESIGN MATRIX OF HIGH SPEED INLET AND NOZZLE RAMP POSITIONS 
Inlet ramp Nozzle ramp Result 
Fully closed (baseline) Fully open (baseline) Baseline, large base drag.  
Mid open Fully open (baseline) Insufficient inlet flow to fully pressurize upper nozzle ramp, 
nozzle ramp blocking some ambient flow that could help adverse 
pressure relief.  
Mid open Mid open Realizes optimal improvement in forces and moments for cases 
and conditions considered.  
Fully open Fully open (baseline) Insufficient internal flow area to pass all inlet flow captured. 
Large high speed inlet spillage can disrupt low speed inlet flow. 
Nozzle ramp blocking some ambient flow that could help adverse 
pressure relief.  
 
speed propulsion operating region, filling only a portion of the aft surface, with the remainder at 
significantly less than ambient pressure. This results in a large adverse force and moment that is not 
captured with the initial, lower fidelity methods.  
Table 1 includes the design matrix of high speed inlet and nozzle ramp positions that Boeing analyzed 
at the transonic condition with 2-D CFD to suggest ways to use the high speed inlet and nozzle ramps 
along with the rest of the high speed flow path to improve performance.  
Opening the high speed inlet mid way introduces additional flow into the aft region which relieves 
some of the adverse pressure gradients on the aft surface as well as changes the amount and direction of 
the force on the high speed inlet ramp. But the high speed design has only limited internal flow capability 
and opening the high speed inlet further actually penalizes the forebody without significant aft body force 
and moment improvements. The baseline position of the high speed nozzle ramp (fully open) is blocking 
ambient flow from expanding into the aft region and mitigating some of the adverse forces and moments. 
Closing the nozzle ramp mid way would require additional actuation that is not in the baseline design, but 
should be straightforward to implement. The surrounding pressure fields tend to force the nozzle ramp 
toward closure when the low speed exhaust flow is over-expanded. Closing the high speed nozzle ramp 
further might direct flow further along the aft body, but would require additional actuation authority and 
would increase the adverse forces on the high speed nozzle ramp. The cases analyzed were not 
exhaustive, but suggest there is an optimum high speed system arrangement that could mitigate much of 
the adverse forces and moments noted if sufficient tools, methodologies and resources were available. 
These deficiencies are presently being addressed from multiple directions, but that will not be covered in 
this paper.  
Low Speed System Location 
The low speed inlet and nozzle locations were also reviewed for possible improvements to low speed 
system performance and volume. The low speed inlet was assumed further aft along the forebody, 
positioning the inlet lower and further back on the vehicle. The low speed nozzle was brought further 
forward along the SERN, positioning the low speed nozzle lower and further forward on the vehicle. This 
resulted in a significant reduction in low speed propulsion length. The preliminary review suggested 
minimal aerodynamic and performance improvements for the low speed propulsion from moving the low 
speed inlet and nozzle elements, but significantly lower flow quality for the high speed inlet when both 
where operating. Under some conditions, interactions from the high and low speed inlets would unstart 
both inlets. From a packaging perspective, the configuration change did reduce the volume required by 
the low speed propulsion system. However, the need to relocate various high speed propulsion subsystem 
components and hydrogen flow lines resulted in a net increase of total propulsion volume required in the 
booster and the access for servicing appeared to be significantly compromised. It was also unclear if such 
shortening of the internal inlet diffuser would allow enough length to mix out low speed inlet flow 
distortions for required turbine engine face airflow quality. As tools and methodologies improve and 
computational speeds increase, it will be beneficial to revisit these configuration changes to identify 
possible design improvements.  
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External Burning 
Reference 4 suggests that external burning can also mitigate some of the adverse forces and moments 
during the critical transonic and low supersonic portion of the ascent. Boeing estimated the hydrogen flow 
required and performed CFD to verify the efficacy of external burning for adverse force alleviation and 
thrust improvement. These results suggest that overexpansion losses could be mitigated and the aft body 
pressures increased to near or even above ambient pressure levels with “reasonable” hydrogen flow rates. 
The biggest improvements are observed around transonic conditions, where the losses are most severe. 
During the external burning calculations, credit for aft body pressure rise was limited to ambient pressure, 
providing full mitigation of overexpansion losses. Not allowing pressure to rise above ambient (and 
therefore generating additional thrust) should be conservative. The simplified methods for external 
burning can easily be added to the lower fidelity analyses to remove the adverse forces and moments on 
the aft surface that are presently not included in the lower fidelity analyses. This would assume that 
hydrogen fuel is available and such an option is allowable by study ground rules. A limitation to such an 
approach is that it might replace design iterations or tool development that could lead to improved 
methodologies and, operational and vehicle design concepts.  
Lessons Learned 
Many lessons were learned by the JSS team during this study. Designing a hypersonic vehicle 
involves complex interactions among the many candidate designs, operational modes and components. 
Coordination of the low and high speed designs and their operational capabilities is important to achieve 
design study objectives. Lower fidelity methods may not capture interactions among these different 
components and their operational capabilities, which can lead to designs that have significant deficiencies 
and would have teams attempting to revise designs and assumptions to meet objectives with inadequate 
tools. Using previous study results for similar (but still different) hypersonic vehicles can lead the system 
designers astray, especially if they lead to ground rules or assumptions that might have been valid or 
useful before, but not as applicable to the new design and mission. Missed or forgotten, detailed 
component information can also lead the system analysts and designers to not fully realize the 
performance potential of critical subsystems. Higher fidelity CFD can reveal a lot of additional detail 
about how the systems actually perform and interact. These analyses can also show how some changes, 
including seemingly minor one, can achieve significant benefits. This is balanced by the significantly 
greater resources presently required to use high fidelity CFD tools to accurately capture these effects.  
Summary and Conclusions 
A joint system study between NASA and the Air Force is underway to review TSTO vehicle 
concepts. For NASA, this effort is focused on technology assessment and revealing gaps in technologies, 
methodologies and tools, not vehicle or concept selection. The baseline vehicle and mission concepts 
have been described, focusing on the booster and more specifically the low speed propulsion concept, its 
component attributes, design efforts, and performance. Initial, lower fidelity analyses indicated sufficient 
performance margins; however, subsequent higher fidelity analyses (including propulsion—vehicle 
interaction effects), resulted in performance shortfalls. Design and operational assumptions were 
reviewed and several items chosen for implementation and re-analysis which indicated pathways to 
mitigate the performance shortfalls. “Lessons Learned” during the study are presented here to educate the 
reader (and as a reference for the analysts) of details to include in future efforts, and moreover to avoid 
these same pitfalls.  
This study notes that there is still a large analysis gap between the lower and higher fidelity tools. The 
lower fidelity tools enable system analysts to quickly perform a large number of iterations and screen 
potential concepts. The higher fidelity tools require significantly more detailed information (which takes 
time to gather and configure) and computational resources to run. For many systems, the interactions truly 
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are isolated and the lower fidelity analyses are sufficient to capture the most salient design features. 
However, for hypersonic, air-breathing systems, the interactions are crucial to the design and ways need 
to be found to include these interactions with greater fidelity earlier in the process. Efforts continue to 
integrate these different fidelity tools to facilitate the information transfer and to balance design 
complexity versus required design iterations (among other factors). This effort has indicated some areas 
where additional resources need to be applied.  
Future Work 
Further details and results for the JSS study are yet to be reported, as well as further details regarding 
some of the analyses included or referenced here. The generic turbine engine model is available for 
distribution and use, but it’s limitations on applicability suggest it is only an interim solution. A 
government model for the RTA cycle is underway for incorporation this fiscal year within the hypersonic 
analysis framework, and will have increased capabilities for additional engine cycles, including more 
detail or analyses for the individual components. It is planned to include significant documentation on 
background and assumptions to guide users to apply it correctly, which is a concern for any tool or study. 
Part of NASA’s focus on methodology and tool development is to be able to assess any technology or 
vehicle concept—which is truly a noble goal. There are various activities underway that will facilitate 
applying higher-fidelity analyses. These efforts include automated mesh and grid generation, improved 
inlet and nozzle methodologies and tools for the low speed portion, etc.; which are especially relevant as 
computing resources continue to evolve and improve.  
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